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The experience of emotion has a powerful influence on daily-life decision making.
Following Plato’s description of emotion and reason as two horses pulling us in opposite
directions, modern dual-system models of decision making endorse the antagonism
between reason and emotion. Decision making is perceived as the competition between
an emotion system that is automatic but prone to error and a reason system that is slow
but rational. The reason system (in “the head”) reins in our impulses (from “the heart”) and
overrides our snap judgments. However, from Darwin’s evolutionary perspective, emotion
is adaptive, guiding us to make sound decisions in uncertainty. Here, drawing findings
from behavioral economics and neuroeconomics, we provide a new model, labeled “The
interactive influence model of emotion and cognition,” to elaborate the relationship of
emotion and reason in decision making. Specifically, in our model, we identify factors
that determine when emotions override reason and delineate the type of contexts in
which emotions help or hurt decision making. We then illustrate how cognition modulates
emotion and how they cooperate to affect decision making.
Keywords: emotion, reason, dual-process, decision making, emotion regulation
The heart has its reasons which reason does not know.
—Blaise Pascal
Introduction
What is the distinction between emotion and reason? This question is as old as psychological
science itself. Barrett (2012) suggested that emotions were both biologically evident and socially
constructed. According to her conceptual act theory (Barrett, 2006, 2013; Barrett and Kensinger,
2010), physical states and actions can be transformed into different emotion expressions under
different social contexts. Based on Barrett’s concept, we define emotion as a subjective, conscious
experience characterized by biological reaction and mental states. When referring to reason, words
like logic, analytic or reflective may come to mind. Reason plays a central role in our daily life,
especially when we are confronted with different choices, decisions and judgments. According to
classic rational decision theories (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Hey and Orme, 1994), we define
reason as a process in which individuals analyze the pros and cons of the presented alternatives,
calculate the utility of different options, and then choose one option that leads to a maximal profit.
The relation between reason and passion has fascinated philosophers for centuries. After Plato
and Aristotle, western literature often treated reason as being opposed to emotion. This is the so
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called dilemma between “the head” (rationality) and “the heart”
(emotion). Though, the exact relationship between reason and
emotion remains a mystery, our daily experience leaves little
doubt that both emotion and reason impact our decision making
to a great extent. Decision making is often referred to as a process
in which a choice is made after reflection about consequences
of that choice. That is, making a decision requires knowledge
about facts and values as well as involves the deliberation about
consequence of the selected choice (Bechara and Van Der Linden,
2005). One example might help to illustrate the relationship of
emotion and reason in decision making. Imagine that you are
going to have a summer vacation and you have to choose between
destinations A and B. During the decision making process, you
firstly analyze the pros and cons of the two locations, and find that
destination A is better than destination B. But at the same time,
you remember a piece of recent news that there was an airliner
crash in destination A. This news makes you anxious and you
can anticipate the unpleasantness of the vacation assuming history
repeats itself. You may also know that the chances of dying in a
plane crash are extremely low and that flying is still incredibly
more safe than driving. Eventually, you give up destination A and
choose destination B instead. The contribution of both emotion
and cognition is undeniable in this situation. However, the exact
dynamic interplay between emotion and cognition remains to be
fully explored. In this review, drawing on findings from behav-
ioral economics and neuroeconomics, we firstly identify decision
contexts in which emotion overrides reason to influence human
behaviors and then discuss how cognition regulates emotion as
well as how emotion and cognition cooperate to influence deci-
sions. We then propose a novel model, labeled “The interactive
influence model of emotion and cognition” (IIEC), to illustrate
the relationship between emotion and reason. To note, because
both the term “passion” and “emotion” represent humans’ sub-
jective feeling and have been used interchangeably (Lazarus, 1996;
Kappas, 2011a), then throughout the review we will employ the
terms “emotion” and “passion” as well as the terms “reason” and
“cognition” in an approximately interchangeable manner.
When Does Emotion Dominate Cognition in
Decision Making?
From an evolutionary point of view, emotion has evolved to guide
behavioral responses in certain contexts. For example, immediate
danger elicits fear, encouraging avoidance of close or looming
threat (Mobbs et al., 2010); unfair treatment provokes anger, lead-
ing to more rejection even at great cost (Sanfey et al., 2003; Dawes
et al., 2012). In this review, we propose that two typical contexts,
labeled as “cognition reduction” and “emotion exaggeration,” may
lead us to make a decision based more on emotion. In cognition
reduction, cognitive capability is reduced so that it is less able
to exert control over related tasks. Cognition reduction can be
observed when information is incomplete (ambiguity), decision
time is limited (time constraint), or self-control is impaired (ego
depletion). In emotion exaggeration, emotional reaction is greatly
enhanced, interfering with cognition and making a passionate
response salient. This context can be seen when threat is prox-
imal (proximity), stimuli are self-relevant (social distance), and
equal resources are distributed unfairly (social instinct). From
an evolutionary perspective, the context of emotion exaggeration
creates a pressing need to react to environmental cues (Mobbs
et al., 2010). In this section, we will identify the two contexts
in which emotion overrides reason to influence decision making
and try to explain the underlying mechanism within the reigning
framework of dual-processmodels (Evans, 2008; Keren and Schul,
2009; Kahneman, 2011). Notably, the dual-processmodels suggest
that mental processes are divided into two systems—one “hot”
system that is emotional and intuitive, and another “cold” system
that is rational and deliberative. The “cold” deliberative system
battles against the “hot” intuitive (emotional) system (Seymour
and Dolan, 2008). As intuitions are often in the form of emotional
responses (Bechara et al., 1997; Monin et al., 2007; Helion and
Pizarro, 2015), we then use intuitive process (in contrast to delib-
erative process) to represent emotional process in the following
sections.
Cognition Reduction: When Cognitive
Capacity is Weak
Making a decision always requires cognitive resources and self-
control. However, when cognitive capacity is weak, which we have
labeled “cognition reduction,” emotion may overwhelm reason
and become more salient in our decision making. In this section,
we summarize evidence about how individuals rely more on emo-
tion when cognitive capacity is insufficient in decision settings
such as ambiguity, time constraint, and ego depletion.
Ambiguity
Decisions are often required to be made when information is
incomplete. Ambiguity refers to the situationwhere decisionmak-
ers have no information about the mathematical probabilities of
possible outcomes (Huettel et al., 2006). Recent neuroimaging
evidence (Hsu et al., 2005; Huettel et al., 2006) suggests that
ambiguity engages brain regions such as the orbital frontal cor-
tex (OFC), the amygdala, and the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex
(PFC). These regions have been implicated in reacting to emo-
tional information (Critchley et al., 2000; Bechara et al., 2003) and
integrating emotion and cognitive input (Critchley et al., 2001).
It seems that ambiguity elicits both a deliberation system (e.g.,
dorsomedial PFC) as well as an intuition system (e.g., amygdala),
showing that reason and passion interplay to influence ongo-
ing behaviors. However, we cannot conclude that emotion and
reason are interactive in ambiguous situations because neural
system responses depend on the degree of uncertainty. Relative to
ambiguous conditions, situations involving clear risk (where the
likelihood of different outcomes is expressed with certainty and
mathematical precision) engage greater activation of the dorsal
striatum (Hsu et al., 2005). The dorsal striatum is implicated
in reward prediction (Knutson et al., 2001; O’Doherty et al.,
2004), indicating that ambiguity decreases the anticipated reward
associated with a decision. Moreover, on the behavioral level,
consistent evidence shows that mean response time is faster in
ambiguous gambles than in risky gambles (Huettel et al., 2006;
Kuo et al., 2009). Taken together, the evidence from research in
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FIGURE 1 | Strategic decision making tasks. (A) The public good
game. In this task, subjects are given an amount of money, and they can
decide how much to contribute to a common pool. The money contributed
would be doubled and split evenly among the group members. (B) The
prisoner’s dilemma game. The players each choose to either cooperate or
defect with their opponent. Each player’s payoff depends on the interaction
of the two choices. For example, the player A can get the largest payoff if
he chooses to defect and player B chooses to cooperate, while the worst
outcome occurs when he decides to cooperate but his partner defects.
(C) The dictator game. The proposer determines a split of a certain
endowment. The responder simply accepts the proposal. (D) The trust
game. The investor decides whether or not to invest and how much of the
endowment to invest with the trustee. The investment will be multiplied.
The trustee is free to return any amount of the increased investment back
to the investor; or he can keep all of the increased investment. (E) The
ultimatum game. The proposer provides a proposal how to divide the
money between the two while the responder has the option of accepting or
rejecting the offer. If the responder accepts the offer, they both get the
money as proposed; however, if the responder rejects the offer, neither
player receives anything.
neuroeconomics suggests that ambiguous conditions engage the
intuition system, allowing individuals to respond more rapidly
and automatically. In contrast to the idea that ambiguity involves
the emotional system, a meta-analytic study (Krain et al., 2006)
showed that ambiguous decision-making elicited greater activa-
tion in the dorsolateral PFC relative to risky decision-making.
These results indicate that ambiguous decision-making is asso-
ciated with cognitive processes. The reasons for these different
findings (ambiguous decision making is involved in cognitive
processes or involved in emotional processes) are not yet clear, and
require further investigation. Interestingly, when information is
too complex or deliberation is too effortful, individuals also favor
an intuitive process to help make sound decisions (Dijksterhuis
et al., 2006). It is likely that deliberation leads to suboptimal
weighting of unrelated information when issues are too complex,
and therefore results in progressively worse choices (Dijksterhuis
et al., 2006). Thus, we suggest that individuals favor an intu-
itive response when information is incomplete or when it is too
complex.
Time Constraint
Researchers often study decisionmaking in situations where deci-
sion makers have adequate time to perform the task. However,
in real-life situations, decisions must often be made under time
pressure. Time pressure is related to processing speed, which is
a widely used psychological feature to distinguish intuition from
reflection (Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977; Rand et al., 2012). In a
recent study (Rand et al., 2012), investigators explored individ-
uals’ cognitive mechanisms underlying cooperative behaviors by
manipulating decision time. They assumed that if the individual
was instinctively self-interested, then faster decisions would be
less cooperative because prosocial decisions would require more
deliberation to inhibit a selfish impulse; if the individual was
instinctively cooperative, deliberation would lead to increased
selfishness and faster decisions would bemore cooperative. To test
these competing hypotheses, they conducted a one-shot public
good game (see Figure 1A) either with or without time con-
straints. Results showed a significantly higher contribution in the
time pressure condition compared to the time delay condition,
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suggesting that faster decisions were associated with more proso-
ciality (Rand and Nowak, 2013; Rand et al., 2014). Consistent
findings are documented in other studies using the prisoner’s
dilemma game (see Figure 1B; Dreber et al., 2008; Fudenberg
et al., 2012) and the dictator game (see Figure 1C; Cornelissen
et al., 2011).
The relationship between time constraint and cooperation is
interpreted through the lens of evolutionary theory which sug-
gests that intuitive prosociality is an outcome of cultural evolution
and natural selection. Humans internalize cooperative strategies
because they help us to better adapt in social interaction (Rand
et al., 2012; Rand and Nowak, 2013). However, an evolution-
ary interpretation does not clarify the underlying mechanism by
which time constraints affect decision making. Why the intuitive
system dominates in the time pressure condition and how it
works require further investigation. Although it remains unclear
whether our innate responses are always prosocial, it is reasonable
to believe that our responses under time pressure are the product
of intuitive process rather than effortful reasoning.
Ego Depletion
Cognitive resources and self-control are sometimes required dur-
ing decision making. However, what if our cognitive resources are
limited and our self-control is impaired? Ego depletion refers to a
state in which acts of self-control draw on a resource that is lim-
ited, leading people to a depleted stage in which they are less able
to exert self-regulation on a subsequent task (Baumeister et al.,
1998; Hagger et al., 2010; Job et al., 2010). For example, subjects
are forced to eat radishes instead of delicious chocolates leading
to a subsequently faster quit on unsolvable puzzles than subjects
who have not to exert cognitive control over eating (Baumeister
et al., 1998). Individuals under ego depletion are more dishonest
about their performance (Mead et al., 2009), less trustworthy in
the trust game (see Figure 1D; Ainsworth et al., 2014), and more
impulsive in making consumer choices (Baumeister, 2002) and
other decisions (Bruyneel et al., 2009). A general explanation of
the link between ego depletion and decision making is the limited
resource model (Baumeister and Heatherton, 1996). This model
indicates that there is a cognitive cost to resisting temptation;
therefore, individuals under ego depletion do not have sufficient
resources to override impulsive behavior (Bruyneel et al., 2009).
Though the limited resourcemodelmayhelp to explain the pro-
cess of decisionmaking under ego depletion, almost no data speak
directly to the underlying mechanism of ego depletion’s effect on
decision making. A recent study (Wagner and Heatherton, 2012)
provided new insights into the process underlying ego depletion,
demonstrating that self-regulatory depletion increased emotional
reactivity in the amygdala and reduced functional connectivity
between the amygdala and the ventromedial PFC. These findings
suggest that ego depletion might disrupt the regulatory balance,
such that regions engaged in emotional stimuli detection are
amplified and the prefrontal regions engaged in top-down control
are impaired. The results cannot be fully explained by the limited
resource model, because increased emotional reactivity in the
amygdala is observed but no reduction in activity in prefrontal
regions is found. Thus, in this review, we speculate that if ego
depletion works the same way in the decision making domain as
in the emotion domain, then individuals’ performance in decision
making may be due not to insufficient cognitive resources, but to
dysregulation between cognition and impulses. Further research
is needed to clarify how emotion and cognition fit together dur-
ing self-regulation, using different scientific techniques such as
functional neuroimaging and transcranial magnetic stimulation.
These scientific techniques would help to directly explore the
underlying mechanism of ego depletion and test the different
theory demonstrating the effect.
Emotion Exaggeration: When Emotion
is Strong
Emotion plays a unique role in decisionmaking (Green andMyer-
son, 2004; Seymour and Dolan, 2008). When emotion is greatly
enhanced (e.g., induced by a proximal threat), it may interfere
with cognitive function and exert a bottom-up influence on our
decision making. In this part, we describe how humans’ tradeoffs
are changedwhen emotion is exaggerated in decision settings such
as proximity, social distance, and social instinct.
Proximity
Emotion may have evolved to solve proximal problems that
require immediate responses and influence our immediate sur-
vival. The proximal problem, the imminent threat, and even the
immediate reward always push us to react rapidly. The animal
model of fight–flight (Cannon, 1929) proposes that animals react
to perceived threat with a discharge of the sympathetic nervous
system—an autonomic nervous system that stimulates the body’s
fighting and fleeing. More specifically, the adrenal medulla pro-
duces a hormonal cascade that results in the secretion of nore-
pinephrine and epinephrine. This model also seems to apply to
human beings when individuals confront something threatening.
Imagine encountering a crawling spider nearby. Our instinctive
defense reactions such as freeze and escape may be evoked for
the sake of self-preservation. Using functional neuroimaging,
researchers have begun to explore how the human brain responds
to the proximity of threat (Mobbs et al., 2007, 2010). Data suggest
that distal threat induces activity in the prefrontal cortices, reflect-
ing the complex planning of avoidance strategies. When threat is
proximal, midbrain structures (e.g., periaqueductal gray) become
more active. Remarkably, the function of the amygdala is also well
documented in fight–flight reactions to proximal threat (Mobbs
et al., 2009; Volman et al., 2011a,b). In an approach-avoidance task
(Volman et al., 2011a), inhibiting anterior PFC with continuous
theta burst stimulation led individuals to commit more errors
when they needed to select rule-driven responses (e.g., approach-
angry) rather than automatic action tendencies (e.g., approach-
happy) evoked by emotional faces. Concurrently, the inhibition
of anterior PFC was accompanied by increasing activity in the
amygdala during the approach-avoidance task. These findings
show that imminent threat (e.g., angry emotional faces) results
in autonomic and defensive reactions mediated by the amygdala.
Taken together, the midbrain structures and the amygdala control
reflexive escape behavior and fear-induced analgesia, suggesting
that individuals are emotion dominated when facing proximal
threat.
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FIGURE 2 | A typical moral dilemma task. The first two screens describe a scenario and the last screen poses a question about the appropriateness of an action
in the specific scenario (e.g., turning the trolley). Participants respond by pressing one of two buttons (“appropriate” or “inappropriate”).
Emotional response to spatial distance can be extended to
temporal distance (Kable and Glimcher, 2007). In an intertem-
poral choice task (Frederick et al., 2002; Green and Myerson,
2004), individuals are more impatient when choosing between
an immediate reward and a delayed reward, than when choosing
between a delayed and a more delayed reward. Neuroimaging
research demonstrates that short-run impatience of this kind is
mediated by the limbic system, which is implicated in reward
processing (Breiter and Rosen, 1999). Notably, the limbic system
has also been implicated in impulsive behavior and drug addiction
(Bechara, 2005). For instance, individuals with drug addiction are
over-responsive to drug-related cues, showing increasing activity
in limbic components system such as the amygdala (Koob and Le
Moal, 2007). It is possible that these affective signals can exert
a bottom-up influence on the cognitive system. If the specific
signals triggered by the emotion system are strong enough, they
would have the capacity to override top-down cognitive control.
In the proximal threat studies (Mobbs et al., 2007, 2010) and
research on intertemporal choices (Kable and Glimcher, 2007),
proximal threat and immediate reward seem to be these kinds
of affective signals, which bias participants’ attention to proximal
distance. Thus, both spatial distance and temporal distance mod-
ulate individuals’ reaction toward different stimuli. When stimuli
are in proximal spatial distance and in the immediate time frame,
individuals tend to switch from deliberative to intuitive processes
and make instinctive responses.
Social Distance
The term social distance refers to the widely accepted and con-
sciously expressed norms about who should be considered an
“insider” or an “outsider.” The norms, in other words, specify the
distinctions between “self ” and “others” (Akerlof, 1997; Bohnet
and Frey, 1999). In social interaction, we are more emotionally
involved in situations in which stimuli are self-relevant, but we
are more analytic in situations where things are physically or
psychologically distant from ourselves (Small and Loewenstein,
2003; Greene et al., 2004; Albrecht et al., 2010). For example,
Albrecht et al. (2010) showed that when confronting a sooner-
small and later-large reward, individuals chose more “sooner”
options for themselves than for others. At the neural level, when
choices included an immediate reward for self, brain regions
including pregenual anterior cingulate cortex, ventral striatum,
and anterior and posterior precuneus that were engaged in emo-
tion and reward-related processing were activated; however, there
were no neural activation differences between immediate and
delay trials when individuals made choices for others. These
findings suggest that choices for self and for others engage two
distinct processes. Individuals hardly resist the temptation of
meeting immediate gratification, while they focus more on long-
term reward for others. This is in line with findings from research
on moral judgment (see Figure 2). Personal moral judgment
(e.g., pushing a stranger off a bridge onto the tracks to stop the
trolley from hitting five people), as relative to impersonal moral
judgment (e.g., turning the trolley away from five people but
toward an alternative track on which stands one person), engages
greater activity in brain areas associated with social-emotional
processing, such as posterior cingulate gyrus and angular gyrus.
In contrast, impersonal moral judgment, as relative to personal
moral judgment, reveals a more prominent area of activation
lying in the parietal lobe that is correlated with cognitive process
(Greene et al., 2001, 2004).
Based on the aforementioned studies, we speculate that if mak-
ing a choice for oneself and making a choice for others trigger
different systems, then such distinct responses may generalize
to other situations where there is no explicit but nevertheless
an implicit “self ” domain vs. “others” domain. Several studies
support this hypothesis. For instance, subjects are more sympa-
thetic with and generous toward specifically identified victims
compared to “statistical” victimswho are poorly identified, known
as the “identifiable victim effect” (Small and Loewenstein, 2003;
Kogut and Ritov, 2005). Moreover, when delving out punishment,
people are more punitive toward identified wrongdoers than
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toward thosewho are unidentified (Small and Loewenstein, 2005).
It is likely that vivid and concrete information is self-relevant to
participants (Kogut and Ritov, 2005), leading to stronger emo-
tional responses. Overall, social distance changes our decision
making: the more self-relevant the situation is, the more emotions
are involved when one makes decisions.
Social Instincts
Emotion may function as a social signaling system. Anger tells
others, “If you continue to provoke, I am ready to fight and attack.”
This kind of anger implicates the inborn tendency (or drive) to
react to the social interaction, and we define such a tendency
and drive as social instincts. The ultimatum game (see Figure 1E;
Güth et al., 1982) is widely used to study the association between
social instincts (e.g., anger) and punishment. In this game, the
proposer provides a proposal about how to divide the money
while the responder has the option of accepting or rejecting the
offer. If the responder accepts the offer, they both get the money
as proposed; however, if the responder rejects the offer, nei-
ther player receives anything. An income-maximizing responder
should accept any positive offer, and an income-maximizing pro-
poser should offer the smallest possible amount to the responder
(Xiao and Houser, 2005). However, studies using the ultimatum
game demonstrate that when responders are offered 20% or so
of the total amount, they are more likely choose to reject the
proposal (Camerer, 2003). Even in advantage inequality situations
(e.g., the responder receives a larger offer than the proposer
in the ultimatum game), individuals dislike unequal outcomes
and are willing to achieve a more equal reward distribution at
their own personal financial cost (Tricomi et al., 2010; Yu et al.,
2014).
Responders’ rejection and punishment in the ultimatum game
may directly link to their feelings of anger and disgust (Pillutla
and Murnighan, 1996; Sanfey et al., 2003; Lerner et al., 2004;
Polman andKim, 2013). Neuroimaging studies have observed that
the insula and the dorsolateral PFC are activated in the contrast
between “unfair—fair” offers (Sanfey et al., 2003; Dawes et al.,
2012). Both anger and disgust have been seen to engage a distinct
region of the anterior insula (Damasio et al., 2000). The higher
the activation of the insula, the higher rate at which participants
reject an unfair offer, indicating that activation of the insula may
be associated with the degree of participants’ indignation and
moral disgust in response to unfair offers (Sanfey et al., 2003;
Dawes et al., 2012). By contrast, activation of the dorsolateral
PFC suggests that individuals are trying to control their emotional
impulses to reject unfair offers (Knoch et al., 2008; Tabibnia et al.,
2008). During evolution, humans may have developed innate
responses to emotionally charged situations such as being treated
unfairly. Human brains might be hard-wired to react to certain
social stimuli automatically and emotions such as disgust may
facilitate such responses. Thus, social stimuli (e.g., unfairness)
trigger emotions (e.g., disgust) that elicit impulsive responses (e.g.,
revenge).
Critical Summary
In summary, we highlighted two contexts (cognition reduction
and emotion exaggeration) in which cognitive capability was
either reduced or interfered with by emotion-related cues or prior
cognitive tasks. In the cognition reduction context, the cognition
capacity is reduced by incomplete information (ambiguity), lim-
ited decision time (time constraint), and impaired self-regulation
(ego depletion). In the emotion exaggeration context, emotional
function is enhanced by affective signals that can exert bottom-
up influence. These specific signals include threatening cues or
immediate reward (proximity), self-related information (social
distance), and social stimuli (social instinct). One common fea-
ture across the two contexts is that decision making engages
greater activation in emotion-related brain regions such as the
amygdala, the hypothalamus and the insula. Moreover, at the
behavioral level, individuals behave more impulsively and make a
faster choice in these two contexts. Because cognition fails to exert
control in decision making in these contexts, passion becomes
dominant and plays a central role in subsequent behaviors.
In this section, the competition between passion and reason
can be interpreted within the framework of “dual-process models”
(Evans, 2008; Keren and Schul, 2009; Kahneman, 2011). Dual-
process models suggest that emotion is automatic, heuristic, and
reflexive; whereas reason is controlled, analytic, and reflective
(Evans, 2008). A great deal of research pursuing the notion of
a dorsal-cognition vs. ventral-emotion axis organization of the
human brain (Dolcos and McCarthy, 2006; Haas et al., 2006;
Anticevic et al., 2010) suggests that emotion and reason are
involved in two distinct mental modes. For example, Greene et al.
(2001) demonstrated that when confronted with sacrificial moral
dilemmas in which one individual must be sacrificed to savemore
people’s lives, participants often responded with an emotional
reaction. Moreover, this gut reaction can be seen at the neural
level that involving greater activation of emotion-related regions
such as the posterior cingulate gyrus and the angular gyrus. How-
ever, when given enough time to analyze, individuals could shift
from initial gut reactions to utilitarian responses. The researchers
interpreted the results with the lens of divided mind—one system
that produces an emotional judgment, and another deliberative
system that can go against the intuitive initial reaction. The two
contexts we mentioned in this section clearly show how the
intuitive system produces strong emotional judgments that are
powerful enough to constrain the functioning of the deliberative
system.
How Does Cognition Regulate Emotion?
In the previous discussion, we delineated contexts in which emo-
tion is likely to override reason to influence our behavior choices.
However, intuitive responses, if unchecked, may turn out to be
suboptimal and even destructive. Cognition can exert powerful
modulation on emotion in many circumstances. Emotion reg-
ulation is a set of controlled processes that explicitly involve
strategies to initiate, increase, maintain, or decrease the occur-
rence, intensity, or quality of experienced feeling states (Eisenberg
et al., 2000; Gyurak et al., 2011; Webb et al., 2012). In con-
trast with the aforementioned definition of emotion regulation,
some other research suggests that emotions are self-regulating
implicitly. Emotions are not just regulated by other cognitive
processes, but more importantly, emotions regulate themselves
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via learning and experience (Kappas, 2011a,b). To address the
divergent results of earlier studies, Gyurak et al. (2011) provided
a dual-process framework to integrate the research on explicit
emotion regulation and implicit emotion regulation. According
to Gyurak et al. (2011), explicit emotion regulation is made up
of a set of processes that involve conscious effort for initiation
andmonitoring when implemented. Individuals are aware of what
they are currently doing. Implicit emotion regulation is evoked
automatically by the emotional stimulus itself, and it can occur
without awareness. In this review, we focus more on explicit emo-
tion regulation during which conscious effort modulates emotion.
Notably, the most widely used model is the process model of
emotion regulation (Gross, 1998). This model differentiates three
major strategies as attentional deployment, cognitive change, and
response modulation (D’Zurilla et al., 2003; Webb et al., 2012).
In this section, we highlight how cognition modulates emo-
tion and how these two processes cooperate to affect ongoing
behavior.
Attentional Deployment
Attentional deployment includes two aspects, namely, distraction
and concentration (Webb et al., 2012). Distraction means moving
attention away from the current situation or directing attention to
a different aspect of the situation (Gross and Thompson, 2007).
This has been shown by instructing individuals to think of some-
thing else or to perform anunemotional task (Masuda et al., 2010).
Concentration can be shown when participants are directed to
focus on or make judgment about their emotional experience.
One widely used concentration strategy is affect labeling (Hariri
et al., 2000; Lieberman et al., 2007, 2011; Ramirez and Beilock,
2011). Typically, in affect labeling studies, participants are asked
to choose either from a pair of pictures or a pair of words.
The pictures or words are related to the emotional content of a
target picture (Lieberman et al., 2011). A recent empirical study
(Ramirez and Beilock, 2011) applied affect labeling in a school
setting and found that writing about testing worries boosted exam
performance in the classroom. It is likely that writing attenuates
the burden that worries place on working memory, thus pro-
viding individuals an opportunity to reevaluate the anxious and
stressful expression in a manner that reduces the necessity to
worry altogether (Klein and Boals, 2001; Ramirez and Beilock,
2011).
Some neuroimaging studies show decreasing amygdala activ-
ity combined with an increasing lateral PFC when individuals
attempt to evaluate emotion-related stimuli (Hariri et al., 2000,
2003). It is possible that judgment or evaluation itself might
engage a greater attention load, limiting the process of perceptual
input and as a result constraining amygdala activation (Bishop
et al., 2004). If this is the potential mechanism of attentional
deployment’s effects on decision making, we assume that cogni-
tion and emotion engage common limited resources because pay-
ing less attention to the emotional stimuli modulates the processes
of both cognitive evaluation (e.g., increased PFC activation) and
emotional appraisal (e.g., reduced amygdala activation). Emotion
and cognition travel opposite directions in attention manipula-
tion, outlining a reciprocal PFC-amygdala relationship with one
domain being strengthened and the other one weakened.
Cognitive Change
Cognitive change strategy, also termed reappraisal, refers to
efforts that change the way individuals appraise the situation and
alter its emotional significance (Aldao et al., 2010). Participants
can modulate their current emotion, for example, by providing a
less negative interpretationwhen theymeet an undesirable picture
content (Hajcak and Nieuwenhuis, 2006) or increasing the sense
of objective distance by viewing picture content from a third-party
perspective (Ochsner et al., 2004b). In general, data from fMRI
studies have found that reappraisal of negative stimuli activates the
dorsal PFC system, which facilitates the selection and application
of cognitive change strategies and attenuates activity in the emo-
tional system including the amygdala and insula (Ochsner et al.,
2002; Phan et al., 2005; Buhle et al., 2014). We speculate that the
PFC system modulates the amygdala response toward emotional
stimuli, showing an interaction between emotion and cognition
in stimuli reinterpretation. Notably, cognitive change does influ-
ence the reasoning process (cognitive process) beyond simply
removing the emotion, extending its influence to change reward
encoding and motivation processes (Staudinger et al., 2009, 2011;
Martin et al., 2013). For example, in a behavioral economics
study (Martin et al., 2013), participants engaged in two reap-
praisal strategies with different goals—to increase or decrease the
importance of a coming decision. The results showed that empha-
sizing the perceived significance of the next decision decreased
risk taking, whereas reducing the perceived importance of the
coming decision increased the risk taking. However, there was no
emotion arousal change when individuals engaged in reappraisal
with opposite goals. These results suggest that cognitive change
can flexibly alter reward encoding and economic behavior with
regulation goals. Another neuroimaging study (Staudinger et al.,
2011) revealed that reappraisal would modulate reward cue and
motivation processingwith increases of activity in the dorsolateral
PFC and attenuation of anticipatory reward cue encoding in the
putamen. The researchers suggested that emotion regulation areas
such as dorsolateral PFCmight exert modulatory control over the
putamen to bring about such effects.
To recap the aforementioned studies, it seems that cognitive
change results in amplified activation in the cognitive system
(e.g., dorsolateral PFC), and reduced activation in the appraisal
system (e.g., amygdala and insula). But this is not always the
case. When anticipating responses that precede an upcoming
emotional event, research also observes increasing, rather than
decreasing, activation in emotional regions such as amygdala and
insula (Ochsner et al., 2004a). The distinct directional nature of
these observed interactions is still unclear. One possibility is that
in regulating an existing or ongoing emotional response, the PFC
system exerts a top-down inhibitory effect on amygdala response
(Banks et al., 2007); whereas in anticipating how a stimulus might
feel, strengthened amygdala-frontal coupling reflects an enhanced
cognitive effect due to a failure to down-regulate amygdala activ-
ity. Another possibility is that using cognitive change to regulate
an existing emotion and to anticipate an upcoming emotional
response might involve two distinct neural modes. Although it
remains unclear why cognitive change leads to distinct activa-
tion in the amygdala, it is clear that cognitive change depends
on the interaction of a prefrontal system supporting cognitive
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process and a subcortical system engaging emotional information
processing.
Response Modulation
Response modulation means enhancing or suppressing one’s sub-
jective feelings, behavioral responses, or physiological responses
within an emotion-eliciting situation (Gross and Barrett, 2011;
Webb et al., 2012). Researchers have manipulated response mod-
ulation in different ways (Webb et al., 2012). For example,
Schmeichel et al. (2006) instructed subjects to view a disgust-
eliciting film clip and exaggerate their reactions (enhance the
expression of emotion); Gross and Levenson (1993) asked par-
ticipants to watch a film clip, but to hide their emotion and act
as if they did not feel anything at all (suppress the expression of
emotion); Quartana and Burns (2007) instructed participants to
suppress all of their feelings and try to push all their emotion out
of their mind (suppress the experience of emotion); and Dalgleish
and Yiend (2006) asked participants to inhibit thinking about a
personal distressing event that had been described before (sup-
press thoughts of the emotion-eliciting event). Indeed, relative to
emotion enhancement (exaggerate emotional reaction), emotion
suppression (suppress expression and experience of emotion) is
more widely explored. Many empirical studies have investigated
the function of emotion suppression in health, well-being and
social interaction (McCaul et al., 1979; Anderson andGreen, 2001;
Nørby et al., 2010). Evidence suggests that emotion suppression
can slow down heart rate and breathing (McCaul et al., 1979)
and help us to forget unwanted memories (Anderson and Green,
2001), but it may also increase blood pressure (Burns et al.,
2007) and even lower individuals’ social support and satisfaction
(Srivastava et al., 2009).
Recent neuroimaging research has begun to examine the neural
bases of emotion suppression (Davidson et al., 2000; Lévesque
et al., 2003; Goldin et al., 2008). Consistent evidence suggests
that suppression increases activation of the prefrontal regions
such as the ventrolateral PFC, the dorsolateral PFC and the
OFC (Davidson et al., 2000; Beauregard et al., 2001; Lévesque
et al., 2003; Goldin et al., 2008). This increased response corre-
lates with a simultaneous decreased response in limbic regions
such as the amygdala and hypothalamus (Davidson et al., 2000;
Beauregard et al., 2001). The PFC, especially the dorsolateral
PFC, is implicated in executive process referring to the ability to
control information processing. The amygdala is implicated in the
evaluation of emotional significance of stimuli (Lane, 2000) and
the hypothalamus is associated with expressing emotion (Carter,
1998). These results seem to outline neural circuitry underlying
suppression of emotion, suggesting that the prefrontal regions
constrain the evaluation and expression of emotion during the
suppression task. In fact, it remains unclear whether the under-
lying mechanisms by which prefrontal regions regulate emotion
evaluation and expression extend to the decision domain. Few
studies have investigated how suppression affects our decision
making. In a recent behavioral study, Heilman et al. (2010) found
that suppression of positive emotion (but not negative emotion)
could reduce individuals risk aversion. Building onHeilman et al.’s
(2010) results, Panno et al. (2013) found that the habitual use of a
suppression strategy (a naturally occurring individual difference
in emotion regulation) was associated with decreased risk taking.
The authors suggested that suppression induced less risky choices
due to participants paying more attention to avoiding negative
emotion elicited by negative potential outcomes. However, in this
study, the relation of suppression and decision making is just
correlational and comes from self-report. Thus, it is not clear how
suppression itself influences decision making and what are the
neural bases of suppression and decision making. Whether our
assumption that prefrontal regions constrain the evaluation and
expression of emotion during the suppression task can also extend
to the decision domain awaits further investigation.
Critical Summary
In this section, we demonstrated that through emotion regula-
tion strategies including attentional deployment, cognitive change
and response modulation, cognition, as relative to emotion, may
play a stronger role in judgment and decision making. More
importantly, we also point out that the ability to regulate emotion
depends upon the interaction between the PFC supporting cog-
nitive control and a subcortical system that represents different
types of emotion-related information. More specifically, subcor-
tical regions facilitate processing of emotional information, and
prefrontal regions can constrain the evaluation and expression of
emotion during emotion regulation tasks. When concentrating
on (attention deployment), reappraising (cognitive change), and
suppressing (response modulation) emotion stimuli, cognition
exerts a top-down regulation of the amygdala responses. The
integration of passion and reason in decision making can be
strongly confirmed by lesion studies from animals (Málková et al.,
1997; Schoenbaum et al., 2003) and human beings (Hampton
et al., 2007). For example, human subjects with amygdala lesions
displayed a profound change in PFC activity related to reward
expectation and behavioral choice, indicating that production of
signals related to behavioral choice in PFC relies directly on input
from the amygdala (Hampton et al., 2007). Thus, based on the
aforementioned studies and other research confirming that emo-
tion and cognition are integrated to determine ongoing behaviors
(Phelps, 2006; Pessoa, 2008; Pessoa et al., 2012), it is reasonable
to predict that emotion regulation depends on the interaction of a
prefrontal system supporting cognitive process and a subcortical
system engaging emotional information processing.
The Interactive Influence Model of Emotion
and Cognition
The most influential arguments to account for the antagonism
of emotion and reason in decision making come from “dual-
process models” (Evans, 2008; Keren and Schul, 2009; Kahneman,
2011). The two processes are assumed to be engaged in distinct
mentalmodes—onemental system that is emotional and intuitive,
and another system that is rational and deliberative. According
to the implication of dual-process models, intuitive process can
produces an emotional judgment, and deliberative process may
go against the intuitive initial reaction. Though the dual-process
models can explain the antagonism of emotion and reason, there
remain several limitations. For one, the idea of dual processes
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FIGURE 3 | The interactive influence model of emotion and cognition
(IIEC). Decision making depends upon the interaction of emotion and
cognition. Two typical contexts, namely cognition reduction (cognitive
capacity is reduced) and emotion exaggeration (emotional reaction is
enhanced), increase the power of emotion but decrease the power of
cognition. The cognition reduction can be seen in decision setting such as
ambiguity, time constraint, and ego depletion. The emotion exaggeration can
be observed in decision settings such as proximity, social distance, and social
instinct. In these two contexts, emotion can overwhelm cognition and exert a
bottom-up influence on decision making. Cognition can modulate emotion
reaction by consciously using emotion regulation strategies such as attention
deployment, cognitive change, and response modulation. These emotion
regulation strategies help to strengthen the capacity of cognition and
constraint the power of emotion. With emotion regulation, cognition can exert
a top-down effect during decision making.
is conceptually unclear and oversimplifying (Kruglanski et al.,
2006; Keren and Schul, 2009). It seems that nearly all dual-
processmodels embrace the dichotomy of intuition (emotion) and
deliberation (reason), yet, whether there are two systems rather
than one or more systems in mental processes remain unclear
(Pessoa, 2014). For another, the dual processes fail to account for
how emotion and reason interplay to influence our decisions in
daily judgments. Take one example of the interaction of reason
and intuition: a person may reason their way to a moral view
(such as that verbal abuse is wrong), and this moral view might
change to be intuitive overtime (Pizarro and Bloom, 2003). Take
another example: individuals implementing emotion regulation
show simultaneously increasing brain activity in the PFC, which
supports cognitive process, and decreasing activity in limbic sys-
tem, which is implicated in emotion process (Heilman et al.,
2010; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013). The above examples suggest
that the mechanism by which a reasoned choice develops into
an intuitive one, and the mechanism by which emotion regula-
tion strategies engage the interconnection of cognitive process
and emotional process, are not well elaborated in dual-process
models.
In this review, drawing on findings mentioned in previous
sections, we integrate the antagonism and integration of passion
and reason in decision making within a framework, labeled “The
interactive influencemodel of emotion and cognition (IIEC)” (see
Figure 3). The IIEC model differs from previous accounts of how
emotion (or cognition) overrides cognition (or emotion) as well
as how they cooperate with each other to affect decision making.
In this model, we postulate that (1) emotion transcends cognition
to affect decision making by reducing cognitive capacity (cog-
nition reduction) and enhancing emotional response (emotion
exaggeration); (2) cognition overwhelms emotion to influence
decision making by explicitly implementing cognitive control via
emotion regulation strategies; (3) decision making depends upon
the interaction of emotion and cognition.
More specifically, emotion exerts a bottom-up effect under two
typical contexts—cognition reduction and emotion exaggeration.
The cognition reduction context can be observed in decision set-
tings where information is incomplete (ambiguity), decision time
is limited (time constraint), and self-regulation is impaired (ego
depletion). The emotion exaggeration can be seen when individ-
uals meet threatening cues or immediate reward (proximity), self-
related information (social distance), and social stimuli (social
instinct). In these two contexts (cognition reduction and emotion
exaggeration), the power of emotion is potentiated and the capac-
ity of cognition is diminished, thus leading emotion to override
cognition to affect decision making. As for cognition, it can exert
a top-down effect through the conscious use of emotion regulation
strategies. When concentrating on (attention deployment), reap-
praising (cognitive change), and suppressing (response modula-
tion) emotional stimuli, cognition is able to alter emotion’s evalu-
ation and expression. That is, using emotion regulation strategies
strengthens the capacity of cognition and reduces the power of
emotion. Neither emotion nor cognition alone guarantees a sound
decision making. This is because decision making depends upon
the interaction of a subcortical system (e.g., amygdala, hypotha-
lamus, thalamus, putamen, and hippocampus) engaging in emo-
tional information processing and a prefrontal system (e.g., dorsal
PFC, ventromedial PFC, dorsomedial PFC, OFC) supporting cog-
nitive process. Such interaction is embedded at the perceptual
and executive levels. Subcortical system components such as the
amygdala are involved in processing of perceptual input (Bishop
et al., 2004) that helps to generate and evaluate emotions such as
anger, fear or disgust, while the prefrontal system exerts modula-
tory control on representation of perceptual stimuli (Buhle et al.,
2014), and thus in turn changes the expression and evaluation of
emotion.
The IIEC model can be supported by evidence from numerous
behavioral studies, neuroimaging research, and lesion cases. First,
data from research on impulsive behaviors indicate that emotion
exerts a bottom-up effect on cognition. For example, healthy
participants are more impulsive with an immediate reward than
a delayed one (Frederick et al., 2002; Green and Myerson, 2004),
and individuals with drug addiction are over-responsive to drug-
related cues, showing increasing activity in the amygdala and
other parts of the limbic system (Koob and Le Moal, 2007). It is
possible that these affective signals (immediate reward and drug-
related cues), exaggerate emotional responses, and consequently
exert a bottom-up influence on the cognitive system as the IIEC
model posits.
Second, research focusing on emotion regulation during deci-
sion making suggests that the prefrontal system exerts a top-
down effect on emotion, outlining the integration of emotion and
cognition in decision making (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009, 2013;
van’t Wout et al., 2010; Miu and Crişan, 2011; Grecucci et al.,
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2013; Panno et al., 2013). For instance, the use of emotion reg-
ulation techniques (e.g., reappraisal) in behavioral economics and
neuroeconomics studies suggests that emotion regulation helps to
reduce loss aversion—a phenomenon in which individuals tend
to strongly prefer avoiding losses to acquiring gains (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1984). Moreover, emotion regulation also increases
PFC responses accompanied by decreasing amygdala responses to
losses (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013). According to the IIECmodel, it
is likely that emotion regulation involves the use of cognitive con-
trol (reappraisal or suppression) that modulates representations
of emotional stimuli and consequently attenuates activity in the
amygdala.
Third, research on decisions about altruism, trust, and fairness
shows the interaction of emotion and reason during social inter-
action (Moll et al., 2006; Spitzer et al., 2007; Buckholtz et al., 2008;
Rilling and Sanfey, 2011; FeldmanHall et al., 2015). Charitable
donation is a difficult social decision involving psychological
conflict between self-interest and the interests of others (Rilling
and Sanfey, 2011). In one study (Moll et al., 2006), researchers
found that voluntarily donating money to a specific charity acti-
vated the mesolimbic dopamine system such as components of
the ventral tegmental and the ventral striatum. The mesolimbic
reward system engaged by donation was engaged in the same
way when individuals accepted monetary reward, suggesting that
donation and earning money shared a similar system of reward
reinforcement (O’Doherty et al., 2006). Remarkably, the PFC was
also recruited when individuals decided whether to donate or
not, indicating that individuals exerted cognitive control over
selfishmaterial interests. The brain processes involved in donation
decisions are analogous to brain processes involved in other costly
altruistic decisions during which participants experience feelings
of other-oriented empathy (FeldmanHall et al., 2015) or obtain
more money than their partners in economic games (Yu et al.,
2014). These results, according to the IIEC model, might suggest
that the perceived joy (emotion) of donation (or helping oth-
ers) facilitates exertion of cognitive control (cognition) over self-
interests and thus guarantees prosocial behaviors. Indeed, not only
social reward, but also punishment threat motivates participants
to behave prosocially. When punishment is available, individu-
als’ increases in norm compliance are positively correlated with
activation in the caudate and the dorsolateral PFC (Spitzer et al.,
2007). The caudate is involved in processing information about
positive or negative reinforcers (Delgado et al., 2003; Spitzer et al.,
2007). These results might indicate that the perceived threat (cau-
date) motivates individuals to override proponent impulses (dor-
solateral PFC), therefore resulting in more fair decisions. Taken
together, humans make altruistic and fair decisions based on
the interaction of emotion and cognition—the perceived reward
or punishment motivating individuals to override self-interested
impulses.
Fourth, lesion studies further indicate how emotion and cogni-
tion cooperate to affect decision making (Davidson et al., 2000;
Shiv et al., 2005; Clark et al., 2008). For example, as we men-
tioned earlier, humans with amygdala lesions exhibited a pro-
found change in PFC activity related to reward expectation and
behavioral choice, suggesting that production of signals related
to behavioral choice in PFC relies directly on input from the
amygdala (Hampton et al., 2007). Similarly, other research also
documents that amygdala damage abolishes monetary loss aver-
sion (De Martino et al., 2010). These results, according to the
IIEC model, may suggest that deficits of amygdala constrain
processing of perceptual stimuli, lower individuals’ sensitive to
loss or reward, and as a result interfere with reason processes
that calculate the losses and gains based on existing information.
Besides the amygdala, another prefrontal region, ventromedial
PFC, is also well documented in decision making (Berlin et al.,
2004). The Somatic Marker Hypothesis (Damasio, 2008) suggests
that bodily states that were previously associated with choice
alternatives are retrieved by the ventromedial PFC. Bodily states,
according to Somatic Marker Hypothesis, can transform into
emotions. Therefore, this hypothesis implies that ventromedial
PFC connects emotion and cognition during decision making.
Patients with ventromedial PFC damage increase betting and
impulsive behaviors (Bechara et al., 2000; Berlin et al., 2004;
Clark et al., 2008), and they exhibit more subjective anger but less
subjective happiness than normal participants (Berlin et al., 2004).
The IIECmodel proposes that decisionmaking depends upon the
interaction of emotion and cognition, so it is reasonable to infer
that dysfunction of ventromedial PFC disrupts the connection of
emotion and cognition. Therefore, the prefrontal system fails to
control the process of emotion, which makes emotional stimuli
salient and in turn exaggerates emotional responses leading to
emotion-dominated behaviors.
To sum up, the IIEC model we posit serves as a launching
point for understanding the interplay of emotion and reason
in decision making. First, the framework we established can be
applied to understanding a diverse range of human decision
making behaviors in which emotion plays a prominent role. We
shift the question from “whether emotions affect decision mak-
ing” to “when and how does emotion affect decision making.”
Our model suggests that when cognition capability is reduced or
emotion reaction is enhanced, emotion can overwhelm reason
to exert a bottom-up effect during decision making. Second,
this model broadens our understanding on how cognition affects
decision making by modulating emotional processes. Through
the conscious use of emotion regulation strategies such as atten-
tion deployment, cognition change, and response modulation,
cognition can modulate the expression and evaluation of emo-
tion during decision making. Third, the IIEC model can also
be applied to understanding the decision-making impairments
that are associated with brain damages. The IIEC model suggests
that decision making depends upon the interaction of emotion
implicated in subcortical cortex and reason implicated in PFC.
Damage in either prefrontal or subcortical regions leads to mal-
adaptive behaviors and impaired decisions. Besides the contri-
butions of IIEC model, two main limitations should be noted.
For one, we put forth a framework about when emotion plays
a prominent role in decision making and when reason does,
but we fail to articulate the baseline balance between emotion
and cognition during decision making. Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) suggested that individuals usually use automatic processes
to generate judgments and attitudes and then use controlled pro-
cesses to make necessary adjustments; that is, emotion process
may initiate some default action tendency and the reason process
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evaluates andmodulates such tendency according to current goals
and social interactions. If this is the case, we might assume
that the default action tendency generated by emotion is the
baseline of the interaction of passion and reason. Without this
baseline, cognition might fail to exert cognitive control. However,
this assumption has not been clearly elaborated. For another,
we have applied this model to explain some research in the
decision domain; however, whether this model can also apply
to other domains remains unclear. A recent study conducted
by Pessoa et al. (2012) showed that low-threat stimuli (fearful
and happy face) improved response inhibition but high-threat
stimuli (stimuli previously paired with mild shock) impaired
performance. According to the IIEC model, we might suggest
that high-threat stimuli exaggerate the emotional response, which
strengthens the power of emotion and then interferes with the
executive control system, leading to poor performance. However,
this is just one example, and more research is needed to test our
hypothesis.
Concluding Remarks
The conceptual framework model we have put forth—IIEC—
posits that emotion and reason cooperate to shape our decision
making. In this model, we suggest that decision making depends
upon the interaction of a subcortical system engaging emotional
information processing and a prefrontal system supporting cogni-
tive process. We emphasize that emotion plays a more important
role when cognitive capacity is reduced (cognition reduction) or
when emotion is greatly strengthened (emotion exaggeration) by
emotional stimuli or cognitive tasks.We also highlight that cogni-
tion can regulate emotion through strategies including attentional
deployment, cognitive change, and response modulation. This
model is important because it takes into account both antago-
nism and integration of emotion and reason in a more dynamic
framework as contrast to previous dual-process models which
embrace the competition of passion and reason. This model re-
interprets evidence that until now was used to support the dual-
process models, suggesting that decision making relies on the
interaction of emotion and cognition and that whether emotion
or cognition makes a more prominent role depends on specific
decision contexts.
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